ABSTRACT The notion of decryption rights delegation was initially introduced by Blaze et al. in EURO-CRYPT 1998. It, defined as proxy re-encryption, allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext intended for a party to another ciphertext of the same plaintext, without knowledge of the underlying plaintext and decryption key. It has been explored to many real-world applications, e.g., encrypted email forwarding. However, the intrinsic all-or-nothing share feature of proxy re-encryption yields a limitation that the share cannot be revoked. This may hinder the scalability of its applications in practice. In this paper, for the first time, we define the concept of revocability in terms of decryption rights delegation. The novel concept enables data owner to revoke the shared decryption rights when needed. Inspired by the seminal latticebased proxy re-encryption proposed in PKC 2014, we design a concrete lattice-based construction which satisfies the notion. In our construction, we make use of binary-tree structure to implement the revocation of decryption rights, so that the update of re-encryption key is reduced to O(logN ) (instead of O(N )), where N is the maximum number of delegatee. Furthermore, the security of our scheme is based on the standard learning with errors problem (LWE problem), which could be reduced to the worst-case hard problems (such as GapSVP and SIVP) in the context of lattices. The scheme is chosen ciphertext secure in the standard model. As of independent interest, our scheme achieves both backward and forward security, which means that once a user is revoked after a time period t, it cannot gain access to all encrypted files before and after t.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) was first introduced by Blaze et al. [1] in EUROCRYPT 1998 to enable an intermediate proxy to convert a ciphertext of Alice to that of Bob without compromising the information of the underlying plaintext. Alice here is known as the delegator while Bob is the delegatee. The semi-trusted proxy can fulfil the conversion with help of a re-encryption key given by the delegator. PRE has been employed into many real-world applications, e.g., encrypted email forwarding, and domain interoperability manager (DIM) module in digital rights management (DRM) systems.
As for the first example, while Alice is on vacation, the email proxy may convert Alice's incoming encrypted emails to those which can be decrypted by secretary Bob via the re-encryption key given by Alice, so that Bob can handle the emails on behalf of Alice. The PRE mechanism provides scalable and convenient features over data sharing: (i) Alice does not need always to be online; (ii) Alice does get rid of download-decrypt-and-re-encrypt mode to relieve computation and communication complexity in data sharing; (iii) Alice does not have to share her secret/decryption key with Bob for encrypted data sharing.
PRE can also be employed to DRM systems. Digital content providers may leverage DRM mechanism to protect the ownership and access rights of digital content from being infringed by malicious Internet users. A DRM system is able to bind digital content with ownership license, meanwhile, only an authenticated user can access the content. DRM, nevertheless, suffers from a domain limitation that a digital content in the domain A can only be accessed by the devices within that domain. That makes DRM non-scalable in practical use. DIM intermediate module, one of the typical applications of PRE technology, may come to help solve the domain problem. Specifically, the module can be used to convert a ciphertext (license) of the domain A to the ciphertext (license) belonging to another domain, say B. Furthermore, the module cannot extract the underlying plaintext from the ciphertexts (licenses), so that the confidentiality of data but also effective cross-domain conversion are guaranteed (please refer to Figure 1 ). But the DIM fails to support the revocability of decryption rights delegation. Traditional PRE, being as a type of all-or-nothing decryption rights delegation, cannot allow a delegator to revoke its shared decryption rights from delegatee (after a re-encryption key is issued to the proxy). In the above encrypted email forwarding setting, Bob can keep gaining access to all encrypted emails intended for Alice (even if Alice is back to work). This may not scale well in practice because one may prefer to only share decryption rights with others within some fixed time slots, for example, after returning to work, Alice may choose to handle the emails on her own without any interference of Bob. To the best of our knowledge, there is no PRE scheme (in the context of public key encryption) dealing with the issue of revocability.
One may think that revoking the delegation of decryption rights is trivial in the sense that a delegator may just request a proxy to delete the corresponding re-encryption key (so that the re-encryption may be terminated). This naive solution, we state, may work in the context where the sharing is not time-related/updated. In practice, it may be difficult to isolate data sharing from time period. In payTV application (e.g. Netflix), an encrypted movie may be watched by subscribers based on payment status. A re-encryption key here may relate with a time period, say a month, so that subscribers can decrypt and watch the movie in the month they've paid the subscription fee. Simply deleting re-encryption key to revoke a subscriber's rights may not scale well, for instance, the subscriber may join back in the next month. Another concern here for the revocation is that if the revoked subscriber is still able to gain access to the movies which are encrypted before the revocation point. In addition to maintain the confidentiality of data, the efficiency of revocation must be taken into account. How to guarantee data confidentiality in the revocation of time-related decryption rights delegation without linear complexity that motivates our work.
In recent years, lattice-based cryptography has attracted numerous attention from cryptographic researchers. The lattice as an alternative underlying primitive is more and more applicable to cryptographic schemes. Compared to the traditional cryptography based on number theory hard problems (e.g., integer factorization and discrete logarithm), the promising features of lattice-based cryptography are as follows: (i) it is conjectured to be secure against quantum computer attacks; (ii) it is with algorithmic simplicity and high parallelism; (iii) it has an average-case/worst-case reduction for commonly used hard assumptions. This paper also seeks a way to construct PRE with revocability in the lattice-based setting to present secure system which can hold against the attacks of quantum computers.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION 1) To the best of our knowledge, we propose the notion of revocable PRE, for the first time, in which the revocability is linked with time period. The definition and security model of revocable PRE are defined in this paper. In the security model, an adversary should follow the restrictions defined as in traditional PRE setting and furthermore, it is allowed to update reencryption key and revoke system users. However, it is restricted that the adversary cannot decrypt the ciphertexts which are encrypted before/after the time period of the revocation. 2) At a first glance, a trivial revocation system (as mentioned in the previous section) may incur that the revocation complexity is linear in the number of users. Our scheme relieves the workload of delegator from linear to logarithmic complexity by using binary tree structure to organize re-encryption keys. We also provide a noninteractive re-encryption key update technique which is used to shorten the time of key update (w.r.t. user revocation).
3) The forward security is considered in our construction.
To achieve the goal, we need to update the ciphertext of delegator that is stored in server whilst the corresponding delegatee is revoked, say at time period t. After confirming to revoke the decryption rights of Bob at t, Alice will update the re-encryption key from herself to Bob so that a proxy cannot convert the ciphertext of Alice to Bob by using the updated re-encryption key. But the proxy can still use the re-encryption keys that are generated at t < t to convert the ciphertexts under t to Bob. The decryption capability of Bob is not revoked in terms of the ciphertexts generated before t. To tackle this problem (to guarantee forward security), after the update of re-encryption key, we make an update for the ciphertext of Alice as well by executing algorithm UpCipher (after ReKeyRev) to update the ciphertexts of Alice under t < t. 4) A concrete lattice-based revocable PRE construction is presented in this paper. The CCA security of our construction is proved based on the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) in the standard model, which is as hard as several worst-case lattice problems, such as GapSVP for some factorsÕ(n/α) or SIVP γ for some polynomial factor γ = poly(n). The main technical roadmap of our construction is to design an interface to combine the technique of revocable IBE [2] with PRE technique [3] to achieve efficient, noninteractive and collusion-free PRE with revocability. Specifically, we embed time information into public key of user and split the public key into three parts and further, merge re-encryption key into a binary tree structure. The time information is compatible with [3] in terms of re-encryption key generation, we therefore inject randomness to guarantee that the time term on both sides of the equation will not be eliminated, which is immune to a means of attack in [4] (note more details are given in Section 5). Furthermore, we prove that our scheme can hold against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA). The tricky part of security proof is on how to answer re-encryption key queries issued by adversary. In the real system, denoted by A R and A L the matrices should satisfy [A 0 |A 1 + H G] = A R + A L , where A R and A L are generated randomly. The method we adopt is to use an invertible unimodular matrix U to constitute the public key of user in the simulation. Let 
, we choose X 00 , X 00 , X 10 and X 10 from a Gaussian distribution with parameter s, so that X 00 X 10 + X 00 X 10 = X 00 X 10 X 00 X 10 R 1 + X 00 X 10 R 1 = X 01 X 11 X 00 X 10 R 2 = X 02 X 12 , and further the re-encryption key from user pk * to pk is constructed as rk pk * − →pk =   X 00 + X 00 X 01 + X 01 X 02 X 10 + X 10 X 11 + X 11 X 12 0 0 I   .
B. RELATED WORK
There have been many research works on user revocation to date. Boneh and Franklin [5] design a key revocation mechanism that allows legitimate users to periodically update the secret key corresponding to time slot. However, their key update algorithm requires a trusted key issuer which consumes computation and communication complexity linearly in the number of non-revoked users. Besides, the key issuer requires a secure channel to transmit the updated keys to system users. Following the seminal work [5] , fuzzy identitybased encryption (IBE) and binary tree data structure are creatively combined together to yield an identity revocation scheme [6] . The scheme reduces the key update complexity (on key issuer side) from linear to logarithmic level. Chen et al. [2] later propose an IBE scheme from lattices with efficient key revocation, and prove the scheme to be selective secure in the standard model and under the LWE assumption. Seo and Emura [7] design a concrete construction based on pairings, in which the construction is able to hold against the attacks, called decryption key exposure attack. Lee et al. [8] propose an adaptive-identity security revocable IBE (RIBE) scheme with pairings by using the subset difference method. Ling et al. [9] deliver the first construction of lattice-based revocable predicate encryption, satisfying the notion of fullhiding security in the standard model. Since its introduction, PRE has been well studied for the past decades. Ateniese et al. [10] design a first unidirectional PRE scheme, which is used as a mechanism of access control over encrypted file system. Their scheme is based on bilinear pairings and achieves the security of chosen plaintext attack (CPA) in the standard model. Green and Ateniese [11] introduce the notion of identity-based PRE (IB-PRE) and propose a concrete construction satisfying the notion. The construction is unidirectional, multihop, and proved to be CPA secure in random oracle model. Canetti and Hohenberger [12] present the first CCA secure bidirectional PRE with high efficiency in re-encryption. The security is based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in the standard model. In order to achieve CCA security, they leverage one-time signature to guarantee integrity of ciphertext. A new notion, called key privacy, is introduced in [13] in the sense that a proxy cannot obtain the identities of delegator and delegatee from a given re-encryption key (i.e. achieving anonymity). Their construction is with CPA security in the standard model. A few replayable CCA (RCCA) secure unidirectional PRE schemes in the standard model have been proposed by Libert and Vergnaud [14] . Aono et al. [15] introduce the first lattice-based PRE based on the LWE problem, which is CPA secure in the standard model. Kirshanova et al. [3] present a CCA1 secure PRE on top of [16] .
The aforementioned schemes, however, cannot provide the revocability of decryption rights delegation. We compare our scheme with other related PRE schemes in Table 1 in terms of functionality and security. We state that our scheme is the first of its type achieving revocability and CCA security with LWE in the standard model.
C. PAPER OUTLINE
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, some basic definitions, hard problems, and some conclusions in lattices are given. In section 3, we present the definition of revocable PRE (RPRE) and further formalize the security model. In section 4, we give a concrete RPRE scheme and prove its security in the standard model. In section 5, we conclude our work.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATION
Throughout the paper we say that a function in n is negligible, denoted by negl(n), if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in n. We say that a probability p(n) is overwhelming if 1−p(n) is negligible. The statistical distance between two distribution X and Y(or two random variables having those distributions), viewed as functions over a countable domain D, is defined as (X ; Y) = We denote column vectors by lower-case bold letters (e.g., x) and matrices by upper-case bold letters(e.g., X). We identify a matrix X with the ordered set {x j } of its column vectors, and let X||X denote the concatenation of the matrices X, X . And we define X = max j x j , where · denotes the Euclidean norm, · denotes inner product. [19] , [20] 
B. LATTICE DEFINITON

Definition 1 (Integer Lattice
Here, we are interested in integer lattices, i.e., when L is contained in Z m . We let det( ) denote the determinant of . The dual lattice of , denoted * , is defined to be * = {x ∈ R n : ∀v ∈ , x, v ∈ Z}. Definition 2 (q-Ary Lattice): For prime q, A ∈ Z n×m q and u ∈ Z n q , define:
We use the following standard notations: -S denotes the L 2 length of the longest in S, i.e., max 1≤i≤k s i .
orthogonalization of the vectors s 1 , . . . , s k taken in that order. We refer to S as the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Lemma 1 ([21], Lemma 7.1): There is a deterministic poly-time algorithm ToBasis(S, B) that, given a full rank set S of lattice vectors in = L(B), outputs a basis T of such that t i ≤ s i for all i.
In 1996, Ajtai [22] showed how to sample an essentially uniform matrix A ∈ Z n×m q with an associated basis S A of ⊥ q (A) with low Gram-Schmidt norm. Here we use an improved algorithm from [26] . with all but negligible probability in n.
D. THE LWE PROBLEMS
In this paper, the security of our construction is reduced to the learning with errors problem, which may be seen as average case problem related to the family of lattices described above. [24] ): For a prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ over Z q , the LWE q,χ problem is to distinguish, given oracle access to any desired m = poly(n) samples, between the distribution A s,χ (for uniformly random and secret s ∈ Z n q )and the uniform distribution over Z n q × Z q . We give an outline of Gaussian distributions over lattice. For any s > 0 and dimension m ≥ 1, the Gaussian function
Definition 4 (Learning With Errors
. For any coset ⊥ y (A), and probability zero elsewhere. We summarize several facts from the literature about discrete Gaussian over lattices, again specialized to our family of interest.
Lemma 2 ( [25], Lemma 4.4): For any n-dimensional lattice , vector c ∈ R n , and reals
Lemma 3 [19] : There are two PPT algorithms SampeGaussia(A, T A , σ, c) and a PPT algorithm SampePre(A, T A , σ , u), the former returns x ∈ ⊥ q (A) drawn from a distribution statistically close to D ,s,c , and the latter returns x ∈ u q (A) sampled from a distribution statistically close to D u q (A),σ , whenever u q (A) is not empty, where T A be a basis for ⊥ q (A) and σ T A ω( √ logm), for c ∈ R m and u ∈ Z n q .
E. ENCODING VECTORS AS MATRICES
Our construction needs a function H f : Z n q − → Z n×n q which is able to map vectors (in Z n q ) to matrices (in Z n×n q ), and the security proof of our scheme requires the function satisfying strong injectivity, i.e., for two distinct vectors u, v,
Definition 5: Selecting a prime q and a positive integer n. We say that a function H f :
is an encoding with full rank differences (FRD) if:
H f is computable in polynomial time.
We use an injective FRD encoding function in [26] , and a short instruction is as follows. We have the finite field Z q , a polynomial g ∈ F[X ] of degree less than n, and let coeffs(g) ∈ F n be defined n-vector which element is coefficients of g. Let f be some polynomial of degree n in
Theorem 2 [27] : Let F be a field and f a polynomial in (1) is an encoding with full rank differences.
F. THE BINARY-TREE DATA STRUCTURE
In order to reduce the number of re-encryption key update (on the side of delegator), we use a binary tree [6] and further assign re-encryption key to leaf node of the tree. Each user has keys computed on of all nodes on the path from the leaf node corresponding to that user to the root node for the decryption of ciphertext encrypted under the time period t. When no user
if t i t then add Path(ν i ) to X end if 4: end for 5: for θ ∈ X do 6: if θ l / ∈ X then add θ l to Y end if 7: if θ r / ∈ X then add θ r to Y end if 8: end for 9: if Y = ∅ then add root to Y end if 10: return Y is revoked, the delegator just needs to submit the key update computed on the node of binary tree to the proxy. When a certain number of users are revoked, delegator first locates the minimal set of nodes in the tree which contains a common ancestor among all the leaf nodes for non-revoked users.
We use the following notations. BT denotes the binary tree. If root denotes root node and ν denotes a leaf node, the Path(ν) denotes the set of node on the path from ν to the root(including ν and the root). If θ is a nonleaf node, θ l and θ r denote the left and right child of θ. We assume that the mark of each re-encryption key, such as rk A− →B , rk A− →C , rk A− →D , . . . , is assigned to each leaf node ν. Upon system registration, the delegator provides the proxy with a set of distinct re-encryption keys for each node in Path(ν).
We here present an KUNodes algorithm which takes as input a binary tree BT, a time t, and a revocation list RL. The delegator is able to determine a minimal set Y which includes none ancestor of node in RL with corresponding time on or before t (revoked re-encryption key), and all other leaf nodes (non-revoked re-encryption key) have exactly one ancestor in the set Y. In other words, the algorithm KUNodes finds a minimal set containing ancestors of nonrevoked re-encryption key. Its output is all non-revoked children of the revoked nodes. The delegator further publishes a re-encryption key update for all nodes in Y.
A mark of re-encryption key is assigned to every leaf node ν, and then to form a valid re-encryption key corresponding to the time t if the set Y and Path(ν) have a common node. Through this operation, every revocation list RL only needs the delegator to carry out the logarithmic work of the maximal number of re-encryption keys and linear number of revoked re-encryption keys. Figure 2a shows an example where there is no revoked user, while Bob is revoked and those nodes flagged by ''1" are included in set Y in Figure 2b .
III. SYNTAX OF RPRE
We start with defining the general syntax of a revocable proxy re-encryption scheme. • (param, RL, ST ) ← Setup (1 n ): Intake a security parameter n, the setup algorithm outputs a global public parameter param, a revocation list RL(initially empty), and a state ST, where n ∈ N.
• (pk, sk) ← KeyGen (param): Intake param, the key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk. We let param include into the following algorithms as an implicit input.
• C ← Encrypt(pk, M , t): Intake a public key pk, a message M ∈ M, and a time t ∈ T , the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C.
• rk pk→pk |t ← ReKeyGen(pk, sk, pk , t, RL, ST ): Intake two public keys pk, pk , a private key sk, a time t ∈ T , the revocation list RL, and the state ST, the re-encryption key generation algorithm outputs a re-encryption key rk pk→pk |t or a special symbol ⊥ indicating that pk has been revoked.
• upkey t→t ← UpKey(pk, sk, t, t , ST ): Intake a public key pk, a private key sk, two time periods t < t ∈ T and the state ST, the update key generation algorithm outputs a update key upkey t→t .
• C t ← UpCip(pk, C, upkey t→t , ST ): Intake the public key pk, the state ST , a cipherext C of pk at time t and a update key upkey t→t , the update ciphertext algorithm outputs the updated ciphertext of pk at time t , where t < t .
• C R ← ReEnc(rk, C): Intake a proxy re-encryption key rk and a ciphertext C, the re-encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext C R .
• RL ← ReKeyRev(pk, pk , t, RL, ST ): Intake public keys pk, pk , a revocation time t ∈ T , the revocation list RL, and the state ST , the re-encryption key revocation algorithm outputs an updated revocation list RL.
• M ← Decrypt(sk, C): Intake a secret key sk and a ciphertext C, the decryption algorithm outputs a message M ∈ M. Correctness: The correctness requires that for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T , M ∈ M, all (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(param), and all possible valid states ST and revocation lists RL, if a user with the public key pk was not revoked before or, at time t, the followings hold:
• We have Decrypt(sk, Encryption(pk, M , t 0 )) = M , where t 0 ≤ t;
• We have Decrypt(sk, UpCip(pk, Encryption (pk, M , t 0 ), UpKey(pk, sk, t 0 , t 1 , ST ), ST )) = M , where t 0 < t 1 ≤ t;
• Given a re-encryption key rk pk→pk |t 1 ← ReKeyGen (pk, sk, pk , t 1 , RL, ST ) and for any C ← Encrypt(pk, M , t 1 ), we have Decrypt(sk , ReEnc(rk pk→pk |t 1 , C)) = M , where t 1 ≤ t.
B. SYSTEM WORKFLOW
We here give a concise flow chart to illustrate our system. We assume there are four system users, in which Alice is delegator, and the rest of them are delegatees. There are two blocks in Figure 3 , indicating the workflow before and after revocation, respectively. In general, our system works as follows. A data owner, Alice, encrypts her data and further uploads the ciphertext to a semi-trusted cloud server, who acts as a proxy. To fulfil secure data sharing, with the reencryption keys (given by Alice), rk Alice→Bob , rk Alice→Cindy , rk Alice→Dale , the proxy can convert Alice's encryption to the ciphertexts intended for Bob, Cindy and Dale, respectively. If Alice decides to revoke the decryption rights delegation of Bob, she may send a request with necessary information to the proxy. By the necessary information, we mean the new re-encryption keys for Cindy and Dale along with a ciphertext update key. The proxy further updates the ciphertext of Alice by using the update key (without compromising the underlying plaintext). We here note that the new reencryption keys are corresponding to the updated ciphertext of Alice, so that the proxy is allowed to convert the updated ciphertexts for Cindy and Dale. In our concrete construction (which is introduced in Section 4), we relate time period with encryption such that delegation of decryption rights (i.e. re-encryption key) is also limited to a time slot. A valid re-encryption requires that the time slot embedded into the re-encryption key must match the one associated with the ciphertext. The ciphertext update stage lifts the ciphertext from an old time slot say t to a new one t , so that the reencryption key (from Alice to Bob) under t is effective no more in re-encryption. In this way, re-encryption is only valid for the non-revoked users, Cindy and Dale. It is worth of mentioning that we make use of binary tree structure to reduce the re-encryption key update complexity to O(logN ) in this paper, where N is the number of delegatee.
C. SECURITY NOTION
We formalize the RPRE-CCA security below. Our security model considers not only the standard notion of PRE security but also the re-encryption key revocability. RPRE-CCA Game: Let 1 n be the security parameter, A be any PPT adversary. Consider the following experiment for a RPRE scheme with a plaintext space M, a key space K, a ciphertext space C and the revocation list RL and the state ST :
Before proceeding to security game, we divide all users into two categories: honest user (HU) and corrupted user (CU). HU is a set of honest users only allowing A to know the corresponding public keys, while CU is a set of corrupted users manipulated by A.
Setup: Output the public parameters param, a revocation list RL (initially empty), and a state ST, where param is sent to A. A is given the target pk * and time t * , labeling it as honest. • O KeyGen : if A request a key of user i with a tag honest, the challenger returns pk i and records i ∈ HU ; otherwise, the challenger returns (pk i , sk i ) and records i ∈ CU , where (pk i , sk i ) ← KeyGen(param).
• O ReKeyGen : A is allowed to ask a re-encryption key query rk pk→pk |t from pk to pk under a time t, the challenger responds by running the ReKeyGen algorithm to generate a re-encryption key rk pk→pk |t for the adversary.
If a query indicates that pk = pk or pk ∈ HU , pk ∈ CU , it will be ignored. The adversary can repeat polynomial times for different couple of identities.
• O ReEnc : A is allowed to query re-encryption tuple (pk, pk , t, C pk ), the challenger responds by running ReKeyGen algorithm to generate a re-encryption key rk pk→pk |t and further computing ciphertext C pk by running ReEnc algorithm. If pk = pk or pk ∈ HU , pk ∈ CU , the query will be ignored.
• O Dec : A is allowed to ask a decryption query on C of user pk (where pk = pk * ), the challenger runs Decrypt to return m.
• O ReKeyRev : A outputs a tuple (pk, t), the challenger updates RL by running ReKeyRev.
• O UpKey : A sends a tuple (pk, t, t ) to the challenger. The challenger runs the algorithm UpKey to generate upkey t→t .
• O UpCip : A is allowed to query (pk, t, t , C). The challenger runs the algorithm UpCip to convert ciphertext C under t to the one under t , where t < t . Challenge: A outputs two equal length plaintext m 0 , m 1 ∈ M. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to C * = Encrypt(pk * , m b , t * ). The following restrictions must be hold:
• O ReKeyGen and O ReKeyRev must be queried in nondecreasing order, i.e., the time of the current queries must be later than or equal the time of previous queries.
• O ReKeyRev cannot be queried at time t, if it has been queried at t once.
• When O ReKeyGen is queried at time t * , user pk * must be in RL.
• A is not allowed to query the decryption oracle for the challenge ciphertext C * of pk * at time t * . If C * at time t * is converted to C * at time t for t * < t by using O UpCip or O UpKey , A still cannot access to the decryption oracle for the query of C * at time t. We refer to A in the above game as an RPRE-CCA adversary. We define the advantage of A in attacking an RPRE scheme as ] is regarded as the other entirety in our construction. The re-encryption key is generated in the following two steps. First, we choose two matrices randomly, namely, A R and A L , such that the sum of the two equals the first two parts of pk. We extract SRK R and SRK L through a Gaussian sampler from the A R , A L , and further store them in the nodes θ ∈ Path(v) and θ ∈ KUNodes(v), respectively. Second, we add a random vector s to protect the time period from being cancelled out during some computation intaking the part A 2 . X θ,t is also extracted through a Gaussian sampler and stored in the node θ ∈ KUNodes(v). The revocation of re-encryption key relies on if SRK R , SRK L , and URK t are in the same node of the tree. In order to answer the reencryption key query issued by adversary in the simulation, we divided the first two parts of pk A into U[A R 1 
, H), and we add −H f (t * )G to each honest user's key. In this way, we enable the challenger to answer the queries of re-encryption key and decryption.
B. OUR RPRE SCHEME
Below we present our RPRE scheme from lattices.
• Setup(1 n ): On input a security parameter 1 n , it chooses r that is a fixed function w( √ logn). Set the modulus q = p e = poly(n) and k = O(logn). The dimension of the public key is m = l + 2nk, where l = O(nk). We adopt the standard trapdoor generation function in [16] to build the gadget matrix G and the two functions associated with it, namely, the invert function g G and the sampler f G . The trapdoors
that are used in our scheme are invertible, and the difference between two such matrices, H − H , is also invertible. This occurs with a non-negligible probability of (1 − 1/p) e when p is prime. Therefore we can always find those matrices with rejection samplings.
The LWE error rate 1/α = O((nk) 3 ) · r 3 . We define an encoding function as enc(m) = Bm ∈ Z nk , which encodes the message space {0, 1} nk to the cosets of /2 for the lattice = (G ) using any basis B ∈ Z nk of , and this encoding can be efficiently inverted.
• KeyGen(param): On input A 0
The public key is pk = (A, H) where
• Encryption(pk, m, t): On input m ∈ {0, 1} nk , a vector r 
and apply encode −1 to the last nk coordinates if it exists, otherwise output ⊥.
• ReKeyGen(pk, sk, pk , t, RL, ST):
, and pk = ([A 0 |A 1 |A 2 ], H ). In this step, the algorithm's input is the public key of the delegator and the delegatee, and a part of re-encryption key needed in our construction is generated by the private key of the delegator. The specific process is as follows:
1) For each θ ∈ Path(υ), if A R and A L have not to been defined, the first two items of the delegatee's public key [A 0 |A 1 + H G] would be divided into two parts: denoted by A R and A L satisfy [
We make A R parse as two matrices A R 1 ∈ Z n×l q and A R 2 ∈ Z n×nk q . Making use of the first part of the secret key R 1 (the Gaussian matrix) and the invertible matrix H ∈ Z n×n q from the public key. More concretely, we sample column wise so that for each column of A R 1 and obtain an l + nk dimensional column of the part of re-encryption key by executing Sample O . And we derive an (l + nk) × l matrix after sampling l times and parse it as two matrices X 00 ∈ Z l×l and X 10 ∈ Z nk×l with Gaussian entries of parameter s.
And continue sampling for the cosets obtained from the columns of A R 2 , we derive an (l + nk) × nk matrix after sampling nk times and parse it as two mtrices X 01 ∈ Z l×nk and X 11 ∈ Z nk×nk with Gaussian entries of parameter s l 2 :
Combined with the above two steps, we could get
We denote X 00 X 01 X 10 X 11 by X θ,R , then store A R X θ,R in node θ ∈ Path(υ), and output SRK R = (θ, X θ,R ) θ∈Path(υ) . 2) For each θ ∈ KUNodes(υ), if A R and A L are not defined, by the above definition we definite A R and A L to satisfy
The same calculation method as the first step is adopted to generate X θ,L = X 00 X 01 X 10 X 11 correspond to A L , and store A L and X θ,L in the node θ ∈ KUNodes, that is
3) In this step, our algorithm whose input is the public key of the delegator and the delegatee and the private key of the delegator is used to generate the time-control part of the proxy re-encryption key needed in the scheme. The specific process is as follows:
whose input is the time vector t ∈ Z n q and the random vector s $ ← − Z n q . In order to hold the containing time t item in the final term, we have to make the containing t item on both sides of the equation inequality, to avoid it being eliminated(under the assumption that the third column and the third row of proxy re-encryption key are identity matrix I). So we introduce a random vector s $ ← − Z n q in A 2 + H f (t)G, make the right-hand side of the equation A 2 + H f (t + s)G:
The method used here is the same as SRKeyGen in the previous step. Sampling for the cosets is obtained from the columns of the matrix
The outputs, namely X 02 ∈ Z l×nk , X 12 ∈ Z nk×nk , have Gaussian distributed entries with parameter s √ l:
We denote X 02 X 12 by X θ,t , and then store θ and X θ,t in node θ ∈ KUNodes(υ), and output
URK t , if ∃(α, β, γ ) satisfies α = β = γ then the re-encryption key is a matrix with Gaussian entries:
on the otherwise, if any two sets of SRK R , SRK L and URK t do not have a common node, rk ← − ⊥. 5) Output re-encryption key rk satisfying:
• UpKey(pk, t , t, ST , sk):
The delegator would generate a proxy re-encryption key rk t →t , and the ciphertext of delegator would be converted at time t to the time t by the proxy. Using the first part of private key sk : R 1 and the invertible matrix H of the public key, and executing Sample O algorithm(similar to the operations in algorithm ReKeyGen), output X 1 ∈ Z l×nk , X 2 ∈ Z nk×nk , where
The re-encryption key is the matrix: 
where e = (e 0 , e 1 , e 2 ) = (e 0 X 00 + e 1 X 01 , e 0 X 01 + e 1 X 11 , e 0 X 02 + e 1 X 12 + e 2 ).
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Finally, we output the ciphertext c = (H f (t + s)G, b) • ReKeyRev(pk, pk , t, RL, ST ): On input a public key pk = ([A 0 |A 1 |A 2 , H ]), a time t, the revocation list RL, and the state ST, the algorithm adds (pk − → pk , t) to RL for all nodes v associated with pk − → pk and return RL.
• UpCipher(pk, b , rk t→t , ST , ): When user pk is revoked and the proxy re-encryption keys are updated, the proxy could re-encrypt the ciphertext of delegator at time t to time t as follows:
where e = ( e 0 , e 1 , e 2 ) = (e 0 , e 1 , e 0 X 1 + e 1 X 2 + e 2 ).
Correctness. We present the correctness of our scheme by showing both the original ciphertext and the re-encrypted ciphertext can be decrypted correctly. We verify that the process of re-encryption. The proxy can convert ciphertext of pk to pk through the corresponding re-encryption key where the pk is not a revoked user:
We further call the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc to get ciphertext 2(r [A 0 |A 1 + H G|A 2 + H f (t + s)G] mod q) + e + (0, 0, enc(m)) mod 2q.
We here explore that how to set appropriate parameters include size of noise so that the re-encrypted ciphertext can be decrypted correctly. Our scheme has the same parameter setting of the original ciphertext as [16] . And the parameter setting of the re-encrypted ciphertext is as same as [3] 's, by taking 1/α = O(nk) 3 · r 3 we have the desired property for both error terms: e 0 R 1 +e 1 , e 0 R 2 +e 2 ∈ P 1/2 (q·B (− ) ). It can be proved that the Decryption algorithm in our revocable proxy re-encryption scheme is correct.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first elaborate that our scheme is immune to a means of attack in [4] . The attack method adopted in that article is that the adversary can tell the real system from the simulation system by distinguishing an equation with public key and proxy re-encryption key. The basic reason is that the second part of the third item -H u G is equal in two sides of the following equation:
It is easy to check and compare with equation:
The adversary could easily tell if the public key pk 1 , pk 2 , proxy re-encryption key rk are from the real system or the simulation system after using the above comparison method.
But our scheme is immune to this attack. We add a random vector s ← − Z n q into the third part of matrix so that the time term on both sides of the equation would not be eliminated, and the adversary cannot distinguish the real system and the simulation system effectively.
Next we consider the security proof of our scheme. The challenger has to possess R and an invertible H so that he could solve the LWE problem successfully. The simulator must guarantee that he is able to answer the query of adversary, that is H is an invertible matrix. However, once the adversary askes decryption query about challenge ciphertext, then H is the zero matrix, the simulator cannot transform it to a G − trapdoor matrix and decrypt it to recover the corresponding plaintext. Therefore, there is no invertible H involved, we embed LWE instance into the challenge ciphertext, and the output of the adversary will help us tackle the decision-LWE problem.
Theorem 3: Our scheme is CCA-secure under conditions of decision-LWE where α = α/3 2 √ n/q. Proof: First, we transform the LWE distribution A s,α = (a, b =< s, a > /q + e mod 1) to (a, 2(< s, a > modq) + e mod 2q), where
This converts a uniform distribution on Z n q × T to a discretized uniform distribution on Z n q × Z 2q . Once the LWE samples are the required style, we construct a column-wise matrix A 0 * and b * , the public key of the target user is generated as follows: select a invertible matrix H 1 * , a time vector t * and a matrix function H f (x), private key R 1 * , R 2 * ∈ D, output the public key
, where t * is statistically hidden from the adversary.
We choose X 00 and X 10 from a Gaussian distribution with parameter s so as to generate public key of valid user. First, we set a unimodular matrix U ∈ Z l×l q , and two matrices A R 1 , A R 2 are generated respectively: Let
X 00 X 10 = UA R 1 , and
Let X θ,R be denoted by [ X 00 X 10 | X 00 X 10 R 1 ]. And put X θ,R into node θ ∈ Path(υ), and continue to produce X θ,L . We choose X 00 and X 01 from the Gaussian distribution with parameter s, make
and
Let X θ,L be denoted by [ X 00 X 10 | X 00 X 10 R 1 ], And put
We choose R 2 ∈ Z l×nk q from a distribution B defined over Z that outputs 0 with probability 1/2 and ±1 with prob- 12 , and X 00 + X 00 X 01 + X 01 X 02 X 10 + X 10 X 11 + X 11 X 12 = X 00 X 01 X 02 X 10 X 11 X 02 (10) each entry of the resulting matrices X 01 , X 11 , X 01 , X 11 , X 02 , X 12 is the inner of product of a Gaussian l-dimensional row-vector and a {0, −1, 1}-vector with half of the coordinates equal zero, which is equivalent to l/2 additions of Gaussians with parameter s. Since in the scheme we obtain 12 )} θ ∈KUNodes(BT ,RL,t * ) .
2. If a user is revoked, that is rev = 1, the produce way of keys are as above. But the challenger can only reply an updated key query for t * through X 00 X 10 R 2 for θ, θ ∈ KUNodes(BT , RL, t * ) Next we consider the decryption query about ciphertext
We first check that H f (t ) is invertible or not, and call
, output is (z, e) ∈ Z n q to satisfy b = zA u + e mod q. If norm of e is small enough, v = b − e = (v 0 , v 1 , v 2 ), maintaining v 0 ∈ Z l q and v 0 ∈ 2 (A 0 ), we could obtain that v = 2(rA u mod q) + (0, 0, enc(m)) mod 2q.
We multiply the matrix to perform the decryption operation
And the message m could be recovered by running the enc −1 algorithm at the last nk coordinates. So the simulator can answer the decryption query of c = (b , H f (t )) for valid user with an overwhelming probability if t = t * , Otherwise, return ⊥. In order to answer the re-encryption query from pk
by the re-encryption key rk pk − →pk , which is decrypted by
To answer the UpKey query of pk * from t to t, the challenger uses the first part of private key R * 1 and the algorithm Sample O , output X * 1 , X * 2 . The re-encryption key returned is + l(αq) 2 · r 2 ), the same to b 2 . Notice that R * 1 , R * 2 ← − D, (A * 0 R * 1 , A * 0 R * 2 , −b * R * 1 , −b * R * 2 ) is negl(n)-uniform distribution according to LHL(leftover hash lemma) and A * 0 , b * is uniform distribution. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext in the view of adversary has the same distribution as what ciphertext in the real system is, therefore the adversary cannot distinguish them.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of revocable PRE and further designed a concrete construction satisfying the notion. In the construction, the revocability is reflected on the update of re-encryption key. We have leveraged binary tree structure to reduce the complexity of re-encryption key update to O(logN ), where N is the number of delegatees. We also have considered the update of ciphertexts so that a revoked user (at time period t) cannot gain access to all the ciphertexts encrypted before t. That allows us to maintain forward security. Besides, our scheme enjoys some distinct features, for example, the generation of re-encryption key is non-interactive, ciphertexts update and re-encryption are off-loaded to proxy. Our construction is lattice based and meanwhile proved CCA secure under the LWE assumption in the standard model. We here leave the efficiency simulation and implementation of the scheme as parts of our future work. This paper also leaves some interesting open problems. First of all, one may consider how to convert our construction with LWE to the version based on RLWE to reduce storage/communication cost. Second, the revocability currently is limited to O(logN ). There may be a way to reduce the complexity to constant. 
